ASD Essential Eight Maturity Model - Maturity Level One (AWS)

1 Patch applications

Asset discovery in AWS is delivered by AWS Config (resource recorder), SSM Inventory and Inspector v2's continuous coverage. The fortnightly cadence itself is not directly observable from AWS APIs - what is observable is whether the discovery mechanisms are enabled.

ML1

Verify the listed checks pass.

Cadence verification is procedural - Prowler verifies the discovery mechanism is enabled, not that it ran in the last fortnight.

Automated

partial

Vulnerability scanning is only as good as the asset coverage it has. Continuous AWS-native discovery is the cloud equivalent of fortnightly asset discovery.

Enable AWS Config recorders in every region. Ensure all EC2 instances are managed by SSM. Enable Inspector v2.

ASD Essential Eight ML1 - Patch applications - clause 1.

1 Patch applications

Inspector v2 is AWS's managed vulnerability scanner; AWS keeps its vulnerability database up to date.

ML1

Verify Inspector v2 is enabled.

Coverage is limited to AWS-resident workloads (EC2, ECR, Lambda). Endpoints (workstations, browsers, Office) are out of scope.

Automated

partial

An out-of-date scanner cannot detect newly disclosed vulnerabilities.

Enable Inspector v2 across all regions and ensure all eligible resources are enrolled.

ASD Essential Eight ML1 - Patch applications - clause 2.

1 Patch applications

Inspector v2 performs continuous scanning of AWS-hosted online services (Lambda, ECR-backed containers, EC2 with internet exposure). The 'at least daily' cadence is implicit in continuous scanning.

ML1

Verify Inspector v2 enabled and review finding age distribution.

Cadence cannot be evidenced by a single scan; requires Inspector audit history.

Manual

partial

Internet-facing services are weaponised fastest after a vulnerability is disclosed.

Enable Inspector v2 with all scan types relevant to the service surface (EC2, ECR, Lambda).

ASD Essential Eight ML1 - Patch applications - clause 3.

1 Patch applications

This clause targets endpoint-resident applications (Office, browsers, email, PDF, security products). AWS infrastructure scans cannot evidence endpoint vulnerability scanning.

ML1

Manual review of endpoint vulnerability scanning evidence.

Evidence must come from endpoint-management vulnerability scanners (e.g. Defender, Qualys, Tenable).

Manual

non-applicable

Endpoint applications are major attack vectors but live outside AWS infrastructure scope.

Run an endpoint vulnerability scanner with weekly cadence covering Office, browsers, email, PDF and security products.

ASD Essential Eight ML1 - Patch applications - clause 4. Out of AWS infrastructure scope.

1 Patch applications

AWS managed services (RDS, ElastiCache, Lambda, ECS Fargate, etc.) consume vendor patches transparently when auto-upgrade is enabled. The 48-hour SLA itself cannot be evidenced from AWS APIs - it requires correlating Inspector v2 first-seen timestamps with remediation timestamps.

ML1

Manual review of Inspector finding age + remediation timestamps for internet-facing critical findings.

Prowler verifies the absence of active critical findings (a proxy outcome) and the absence of unsupported runtimes (a precondition); SLA timing requires manual correlation.

Manual

partial

Critical vulnerabilities with working exploits are weaponised within hours.

Maintain auto-upgrade flags on managed services. Configure Inspector v2 alerting for critical findings on internet-facing resources with 48-hour escalation.

ASD Essential Eight ML1 - Patch applications - clause 5. SLA timing out of Prowler scope.

1 Patch applications

Auto-upgrade flags on AWS managed services (RDS, Aurora, ElastiCache, MemoryDB, DMS, MQ, Redshift, OpenSearch, MSK, Fargate) and SSM Patch Manager for self-managed compute deliver the underlying capability. SLA timing itself is not surfaced.

ML1

Run all listed checks. Manually review patch deployment timeline.

SLA window evidence requires patch logs / change-management correlation, not in Prowler scope.

Manual

partial

Two weeks is the standard ASD cadence for non-critical patching of internet-facing services.

Enable auto minor version upgrade on all managed data services. Enable SSM Patch Manager on all EC2.

ASD Essential Eight ML1 - Patch applications - clause 6.

1 Patch applications

Endpoint-resident applications (Office, browsers, email clients, PDF, security products) are out of AWS infrastructure scope.

ML1

Manual review of endpoint patch reports.

Evidence must come from endpoint patch-management tooling.

Manual

non-applicable

Same as 1.4 - this is endpoint-management territory.

Use endpoint patch-management (Intune, SCCM, third-party MDM) to enforce two-week SLA on these application classes.

ASD Essential Eight ML1 - Patch applications - clause 7. Out of AWS infrastructure scope.

1 Patch applications

Online services in AWS scope: Lambda runtimes, RDS engines, EKS Kubernetes versions, ECS/Fargate platform versions, Kafka, OpenSearch. Prowler can detect deprecated/unsupported versions across all of these.

ML1

Run all listed checks.

Automated

full

Unsupported services no longer receive security patches.

Migrate Lambda functions off deprecated runtimes; remove RDS instances on Extended Support or deprecated engines; upgrade EKS clusters to supported Kubernetes versions; use latest Fargate platform version; keep Kafka and OpenSearch at supported versions.

ASD Essential Eight ML1 - Patch applications - clause 8.

1 Patch applications

Endpoint-resident applications. Out of AWS infrastructure scope.

ML1

Manual review of endpoint inventory.

Evidence must come from endpoint software inventory.

Manual

non-applicable

Adobe Flash Player end-of-life is the canonical example - removal must be enforced at the endpoint.

Inventory endpoint applications; enforce removal of EOL software via endpoint management.

ASD Essential Eight ML1 - Patch applications - clause 9. Out of AWS infrastructure scope.

2 Patch operating systems

Same asset-discovery clause as 1.1, applied here to operating systems. AWS Config + SSM Inventory continuously discovers EC2 instances and their OS metadata; Inspector v2 enrols them automatically.

ML1

Run all listed checks.

Automated

full

OS vulnerability scanning depends on asset coverage.

Enable AWS Config in every region; ensure all EC2 are SSM-managed; enable Inspector v2.

ASD Essential Eight ML1 - Patch operating systems - clause 1.

2 Patch operating systems

Inspector v2 is AWS's managed OS vulnerability scanner with continuously updated database.

ML1

Verify Inspector v2 is enabled.

Automated

full

Same rationale as 1.2 applied to OS scanning.

Enable Inspector v2 in all regions.

ASD Essential Eight ML1 - Patch operating systems - clause 2.

2 Patch operating systems

Internet-facing servers in AWS map to EC2 with public IP / behind public ALB / NLB. Inspector v2 performs continuous OS scanning. Network devices (firewalls, routers) inside customer VPC are typically appliance AMIs - scanned by Inspector when SSM-managed.

ML1

Verify Inspector v2 enabled with EC2 scan type. Manually verify cadence via finding history.

Daily cadence implicit in continuous scanning; not directly verifiable.

Manual

partial

Internet-facing OS surface is the primary entry point for opportunistic attacks.

Enable Inspector v2 EC2 scanning. Ensure network appliances are SSM-managed where possible.

ASD Essential Eight ML1 - Patch operating systems - clause 3.

2 Patch operating systems

Workstations are out of AWS infrastructure scope. Non-internet-facing EC2 servers and appliance AMIs are scanned by Inspector v2 when SSM-managed.

ML1

Manual review.

Workstation scanning is endpoint-management territory.

Manual

partial

Internal hosts still carry lateral-movement risk.

Ensure internal EC2 are SSM-managed and Inspector v2 covers them. For workstations, use endpoint vulnerability tooling.

ASD Essential Eight ML1 - Patch operating systems - clause 4.

2 Patch operating systems

SLA for critical OS patches on internet-facing hosts. AWS APIs do not surface time-to-patch.

ML1

Manual: review patch deployment timestamps for internet-facing critical OS findings.

Requires correlation between Inspector finding age and SSM patch logs.

Manual

partial

Critical OS CVEs on internet-facing surface are weaponised fastest.

Configure Inspector v2 critical-finding alerting; route to a 48-hour remediation queue. Configure SSM Patch Manager with appropriate baselines.

ASD Essential Eight ML1 - Patch operating systems - clause 5. SLA timing out of Prowler scope.

2 Patch operating systems

Two-week SLA for non-critical OS patches on internet-facing hosts. SSM Patch Manager delivers the capability; SLA evidence is procedural.

ML1

Verify SSM patch compliance + manually verify deployment cadence.

SLA window evidence requires patch logs.

Manual

partial

Two-week cadence is the ASD baseline for non-critical OS patching of internet-facing hosts.

Configure SSM Patch Manager with a fortnightly maintenance window for internet-facing EC2.

ASD Essential Eight ML1 - Patch operating systems - clause 6.

2 Patch operating systems

One-month SLA for OS patches on workstations and non-internet-facing hosts. AWS infrastructure covers non-internet-facing EC2 via SSM Patch Manager. Workstations are endpoint-management territory.

ML1

Verify SSM patch compliance for non-internet-facing instances.

Workstation patch evidence is endpoint-side.

Manual

partial

Internal hosts have a longer SLA but still need regular patching.

Configure SSM Patch Manager with a monthly maintenance window for non-internet-facing EC2.

ASD Essential Eight ML1 - Patch operating systems - clause 7.

2 Patch operating systems

Detect EC2 instances on outdated AMIs, EKS clusters on unsupported Kubernetes versions, and AMIs that may be unsupported.

ML1

Run all listed checks.

Prowler verifies AMI freshness and EKS version; the operator must define the policy threshold for ec2_instance_older_than_specific_days.

Automated

full

Unsupported OS receives no further security updates.

Replace EC2 instances on unsupported AMIs. Upgrade EKS clusters to supported Kubernetes versions.

ASD Essential Eight ML1 - Patch operating systems - clause 8.

3 Multi-factor authentication

MFA on the organisation's own AWS-hosted online services that handle sensitive data. Prowler verifies MFA on root, IAM users with console access, IAM admins and Directory Service. Whether a given service handles 'sensitive data' is a classification call the operator must make.

ML1

Run the listed checks. Manually classify which services hold sensitive data and confirm MFA coverage.

Sensitive-data classification is procedural; Prowler verifies MFA presence on the underlying identity surface.

Manual

partial

MFA prevents credential-only compromise.

Enable hardware MFA on root and admin IAM users. Require MFA for all IAM users with console access. Enable MFA on Directory Service. Configure CloudWatch metric filter for non-MFA sign-ins.

ASD Essential Eight ML1 - Multi-factor authentication - clause 1.

3 Multi-factor authentication

Third-party online services (SaaS providers, external platforms) are outside the AWS account. AWS infrastructure scans cannot evidence MFA enforcement on those services.

ML1

Manual review of third-party service IdP / SSO configuration.

Evidence must come from each third-party provider's IAM / SSO configuration.

Manual

non-applicable

Third-party services are a major data-exfiltration vector.

Enforce MFA in the third-party service's identity provider or SSO upstream (e.g. via AWS IAM Identity Center or external IdP).

ASD Essential Eight ML1 - Multi-factor authentication - clause 2. Out of AWS infrastructure scope.

3 Multi-factor authentication

Same as 3.2, applied to non-sensitive third-party services. Out of AWS infrastructure scope.

ML1

Manual review.

Evidence must come from each third-party provider.

Manual

non-applicable

Defence in depth - even non-sensitive services can be staging ground for further attacks.

Where the third-party service supports it, enforce MFA upstream via SSO.

ASD Essential Eight ML1 - Multi-factor authentication - clause 3. Out of AWS infrastructure scope.

3 Multi-factor authentication

Online customer services hosted by the organisation in AWS typically use Cognito. Whether a Cognito user pool serves users handling sensitive customer data is an operator classification.

ML1

Verify Cognito MFA per pool.

Sensitive-data classification is procedural.

Manual

partial

Insider users of customer-facing services need MFA when they handle sensitive customer data.

Enable MFA on every Cognito user pool that serves users handling sensitive customer data.

ASD Essential Eight ML1 - Multi-factor authentication - clause 4.

3 Multi-factor authentication

Third-party customer-facing services. Out of AWS infrastructure scope.

ML1

Manual review.

Evidence must come from the third-party provider.

Manual

non-applicable

Sensitive customer data on third-party platforms still needs MFA.

Enforce MFA in the third-party customer service's IdP.

ASD Essential Eight ML1 - Multi-factor authentication - clause 5. Out of AWS infrastructure scope.

3 Multi-factor authentication

Customer-facing AWS-hosted services typically use Cognito user pools. Prowler can verify MFA is enabled on the pool.

ML1

Verify Cognito MFA configuration.

Cognito MFA can be enforced or optional - the check verifies it is at least configured.

Automated

partial

Customers handling sensitive data benefit from MFA the same as employees.

Enable MFA on customer-facing Cognito user pools.

ASD Essential Eight ML1 - Multi-factor authentication - clause 6.

3 Multi-factor authentication

MFA factor type. AWS IAM API does not surface the underlying authenticator type granularly, only whether MFA is virtual or hardware. Hardware MFA on root + admin is the strongest signal Prowler can give.

ML1

Run the listed checks. Manually review IdP audit feed for factor distribution.

Prowler cannot universally verify factor type for every identity. Hardware MFA detection is the closest proxy.

Manual

limited

MFA must combine factor categories - knowledge alone doesn't qualify.

Prefer hardware MFA on privileged identities.

ASD Essential Eight ML1 - Multi-factor authentication - clause 7.

4 Restrict administrative privileges

Procedural control: privileged-access requests must go through a validation workflow. Prowler does not evaluate change-management workflows.

ML1

Manual review of change-management evidence.

Evidence comes from access-review tickets, change management or AWS IAM Identity Center request workflows.

Manual

non-applicable

Privileged access without validation is a primary insider-risk vector.

Implement a request/approve workflow for AWS privileged role assumption (e.g. IAM Identity Center permission sets with approval) or rely on an external ITSM workflow.

ASD Essential Eight ML1 - Restrict administrative privileges - clause 1. Procedural.

4 Restrict administrative privileges

Privileged AWS access should be exercised through dedicated identities (separate IAM users / dedicated permission sets), not through a daily-driver identity. Prowler can detect IAM users carrying admin policies but cannot infer whether they are dedicated.

ML1

Run listed checks; manually verify each admin identity is dedicated.

Prowler flags admin-bearing identities; the operator must verify each is dedicated to privileged duties.

Manual

partial

Dual-purpose accounts (admin + daily) increase blast radius of credential theft.

Use IAM Identity Center permission sets or dedicated IAM users with admin policies, separated from daily-driver identities.

ASD Essential Eight ML1 - Restrict administrative privileges - clause 2.

4 Restrict administrative privileges

Network-level control: privileged accounts must not browse the internet or access email. In AWS this would map to SCPs / VPC egress controls / dedicated jump-host architecture - none directly verifiable by a posture scan.

ML1

Manual review of SCPs and network architecture.

Evidence comes from network architecture and SCP review.

Manual

limited

If a privileged account never touches the internet, it cannot be phished or drive-by compromised.

Restrict privileged AWS sessions to a hardened bastion / Cloud Workspace with no general internet egress. Apply SCPs that deny privileged roles from launching workloads with unrestricted internet egress.

ASD Essential Eight ML1 - Restrict administrative privileges - clause 3.

4 Restrict administrative privileges

Least-privilege enforcement on AWS IAM. This is the cleanest cloud-native mapping in the entire framework: Prowler can verify policy scoping, privilege escalation paths and Access Analyzer findings.

ML1

Run all listed checks.

Automated

full

Strictly-scoped privileged access reduces blast radius of compromise.

Audit and tighten managed/inline policies; remove privilege-escalation paths; attach policies only to groups/roles; enable Access Analyzer and resolve findings.

ASD Essential Eight ML1 - Restrict administrative privileges - clause 4.

4 Restrict administrative privileges

Operating-environment separation is an endpoint / virtualisation control (privileged jump host vs daily workstation). Out of AWS infrastructure scope.

ML1

Manual review of endpoint architecture.

Evidence comes from endpoint architecture (PAW / privileged jump hosts / WorkSpaces partitioning).

Manual

non-applicable

Operating-environment isolation prevents malware on the unprivileged side from attacking privileged sessions.

Provide privileged users with a dedicated PAW or privileged WorkSpaces image.

ASD Essential Eight ML1 - Restrict administrative privileges - clause 5. Out of AWS infrastructure scope.

4 Restrict administrative privileges

Endpoint logon-policy control. Out of AWS infrastructure scope.

ML1

Manual review.

Evidence comes from endpoint logon policy / Active Directory.

Manual

non-applicable

Even read-only access to a privileged environment is a foothold.

Enforce logon restrictions on privileged endpoints.

ASD Essential Eight ML1 - Restrict administrative privileges - clause 6. Out of AWS infrastructure scope.

4 Restrict administrative privileges

Endpoint logon-policy control. Out of AWS infrastructure scope.

ML1

Manual review.

Evidence comes from endpoint logon policy / Active Directory.

Manual

non-applicable

Privileged credentials must never be entered on potentially-compromised unprivileged endpoints.

Enforce that privileged accounts can only logon to PAWs / jump hosts.

ASD Essential Eight ML1 - Restrict administrative privileges - clause 7. Out of AWS infrastructure scope.

5 Application control

Application control is fundamentally an endpoint allowlist. AWS infrastructure has no direct equivalent for workstation app control.

ML1

Manual review of endpoint app-control coverage.

Evidence comes from endpoint allowlist tooling (AppLocker, WDAC, third-party EDR).

Manual

non-applicable

Application control on workstations is the highest-impact mitigation against malware.

Deploy AppLocker / Windows Defender Application Control / equivalent on every workstation.

ASD Essential Eight ML1 - Application control - clause 1. Out of AWS infrastructure scope.

5 Application control

Endpoint app-control scope (user profiles, temp folders). Out of AWS infrastructure scope.

ML1

Manual review.

Evidence comes from endpoint app-control configuration.

Manual

non-applicable

User-writable folders are the most common malware drop locations.

Configure AppLocker / WDAC rules to cover %APPDATA%, %TEMP%, browser caches, email-client temp folders.

ASD Essential Eight ML1 - Application control - clause 2. Out of AWS infrastructure scope.

5 Application control

Endpoint allowlisting of executable file types. Out of AWS infrastructure scope.

ML1

Manual review of allowlist contents.

Evidence comes from endpoint app-control rule set.

Manual

non-applicable

An effective allowlist must cover all execution surfaces, not only .exe.

Define an organisation-approved allowlist covering all listed file types and enforce it in AppLocker / WDAC / equivalent.

ASD Essential Eight ML1 - Application control - clause 3. Out of AWS infrastructure scope.

6 Restrict Microsoft Office macros

Endpoint / Microsoft 365 control. Out of AWS infrastructure scope.

ML1

Manual review of M365 macro policy.

Evidence comes from Microsoft 365 / Group Policy.

Manual

non-applicable

Most users never need Office macros. Disabling by default removes a major delivery vector.

Disable macros via Group Policy / Intune / M365 admin policies, with explicit allowlist for business-justified users.

ASD Essential Eight ML1 - Restrict Microsoft Office macros - clause 1. Out of AWS infrastructure scope.

6 Restrict Microsoft Office macros

Endpoint / Microsoft 365 control (Mark-of-the-Web macro blocking). Out of AWS infrastructure scope.

ML1

Manual review.

Evidence comes from Microsoft 365 / Group Policy.

Manual

non-applicable

Internet-sourced documents are the primary macro-delivery vector.

Enable 'Block macros from running in Office files from the internet' via Group Policy / Intune.

ASD Essential Eight ML1 - Restrict Microsoft Office macros - clause 2. Out of AWS infrastructure scope.

6 Restrict Microsoft Office macros

Endpoint / Microsoft 365 control (AMSI integration with macros). Out of AWS infrastructure scope.

ML1

Manual review.

Evidence comes from endpoint AV / AMSI configuration.

Manual

non-applicable

Antivirus scanning of macros at run-time catches polymorphic payloads that static analysis misses.

Enable AMSI macro scanning via Group Policy.

ASD Essential Eight ML1 - Restrict Microsoft Office macros - clause 3. Out of AWS infrastructure scope.

6 Restrict Microsoft Office macros

Endpoint / Microsoft 365 control. Out of AWS infrastructure scope.

ML1

Manual review.

Evidence comes from Group Policy lockdown.

Manual

non-applicable

If users can change macro security settings, the previous controls become advisory.

Apply Group Policy that prevents users from changing Office macro security settings.

ASD Essential Eight ML1 - Restrict Microsoft Office macros - clause 4. Out of AWS infrastructure scope.

7 User application hardening

Endpoint browser control. Out of AWS infrastructure scope.

ML1

Manual review.

Evidence comes from endpoint software inventory.

Manual

non-applicable

Internet Explorer 11 is end-of-life and a recurring entry vector.

Remove or disable IE 11 via endpoint management.

ASD Essential Eight ML1 - User application hardening - clause 1. Out of AWS infrastructure scope.

7 User application hardening

Endpoint browser control. Out of AWS infrastructure scope.

ML1

Manual review.

Evidence comes from browser policy enforced via endpoint management.

Manual

non-applicable

Java in browsers is a long-standing exploitation surface.

Block Java in browsers via Group Policy / browser policy templates.

ASD Essential Eight ML1 - User application hardening - clause 2. Out of AWS infrastructure scope.

7 User application hardening

Endpoint browser control. Out of AWS infrastructure scope.

ML1

Manual review.

Evidence comes from browser ad-blocking enforcement.

Manual

non-applicable

Malicious advertising is a passive infection vector.

Deploy enterprise ad-blocking via browser policy or upstream DNS filtering.

ASD Essential Eight ML1 - User application hardening - clause 3. Out of AWS infrastructure scope.

7 User application hardening

Endpoint browser control. Out of AWS infrastructure scope.

ML1

Manual review.

Evidence comes from browser policy enforcement.

Manual

non-applicable

If users can change browser security settings, the previous controls become advisory.

Lock browser security settings via Group Policy / browser policy templates.

ASD Essential Eight ML1 - User application hardening - clause 4. Out of AWS infrastructure scope.

8 Regular backups

Backup coverage across AWS data services. Whether the backup frequency and retention align with business criticality is an operator classification.

ML1

Run all listed checks. Manually verify cadence and retention match criticality.

Prowler verifies backup mechanisms exist; criticality alignment is procedural.

Manual

partial

Backups must exist and align with the criticality of the data they protect.

Define AWS Backup plans + vaults covering critical services; enable engine-native backups on RDS / ElastiCache / DocumentDB / Neptune / Redshift; enable EFS Backup, EBS Backup, DynamoDB PITR; configure DLM lifecycle.

ASD Essential Eight ML1 - Regular backups - clause 1.

8 Regular backups

Common-point-in-time recovery is delivered by DynamoDB PITR, Aurora backtrack, RDS automated backups and S3 versioning.

ML1

Run listed checks.

Coordinated multi-service PIT remains an architectural decision.

Automated

partial

Without coordinated PIT, restoration produces an inconsistent state across services.

Enable DynamoDB PITR, Aurora backtrack, RDS automated backups and S3 versioning on all critical data stores.

ASD Essential Eight ML1 - Regular backups - clause 2.

8 Regular backups

Secure: encryption + no public exposure. Resilient: cross-region replication / multi-AZ vault placement / lifecycle. Prowler covers both.

ML1

Run all listed checks.

Automated

full

A public or unencrypted backup is a data breach in waiting.

Enforce encryption on Backup vaults and recovery points, RDS snapshots. Block public access on EBS / RDS / DocumentDB / Neptune snapshots account-wide. Enable S3 cross-region replication for critical buckets.

ASD Essential Eight ML1 - Regular backups - clause 3.

8 Regular backups

Restoration testing is a procedural / operational control. AWS APIs do not surface evidence that a restoration test occurred.

ML1

Manual review of DR exercise evidence (last 12 months).

Evidence comes from DR exercise reports.

Manual

non-applicable

Untested backups are unreliable backups.

Schedule and execute DR exercises that include backup restoration to a common point in time. Record results.

ASD Essential Eight ML1 - Regular backups - clause 4. Procedural; out of Prowler scope.

8 Regular backups

Cross-account / cross-user backup isolation. Public-snapshot blocking is the strongest cloud-side signal Prowler surfaces. Fine-grained per-user backup access scoping requires manual IAM/Vault policy review.

ML1

Run listed checks. Manually review backup IAM scoping.

Public-access blocks are partial - true 'cannot access other users' backups' requires IAM scoping review.

Manual

partial

Backups containing other users' data must never be readable by general users.

Block public access on EBS / RDS / DocumentDB / Neptune snapshots. Apply IAM policies that restrict backup-read APIs to dedicated backup-operator roles.

ASD Essential Eight ML1 - Regular backups - clause 5.

8 Regular backups

Backup immutability against unprivileged accounts. Cloud-native delivery: AWS Backup Vault Lock + IAM/SCP scoping. Prowler does not currently surface Vault Lock state, so this clause is largely operator-evidenced.

ML1

Manual review of Vault Lock + SCP coverage.

Vault Lock is the strongest cloud control here but is not surfaced by Prowler today.

Manual

partial

Without write protection, ransomware that compromises any user can erase backups.

Apply AWS Backup Vault Lock with retention enforcement. Use SCPs to deny backup:Delete*, rds:DeleteDB*Snapshot, s3:DeleteObjectVersion, etc. for non-backup-operator principals.

ASD Essential Eight ML1 - Regular backups - clause 6.